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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective 
To understand the different types and causes of prescribing errors associated with computerized 
provider order entry (CPOE) systems, and recommend improvements in these systems.  
 
Materials and Methods 
We conducted a systematic review of the literature published between January 2004 and June 
2015 using three large databases: the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature 
(CINAHL), Embase and Medline. Studies that reported qualitative data about the types and 
causes of these errors were included. A narrative synthesis of all eligible studies was undertaken. 
 
Results 
A total of 1,185 publications were identified, of which 34were included in the review. We 
identified eight key themes associated with CPOE-related prescribing errors: computer screen 
display, drop-down menus and auto-population, wording, default settings, non-intuitive or 
inflexible ordering, repeat prescriptions and automated processes, users’ work processes, and 
CDS systems. Displaying an incomplete list of a patient’s medications on the computer screen 
often contributed to prescribing errors. Lack of system flexibility resulted in users employing 
error prone workarounds, such as the addition of contradictory free-text comments. Users’ 
misinterpretations of how text was presented in CPOE systems were also linked with the 
occurrence of prescribing errors. 
 
 Discussion and Conclusions 
Human factors design is important to reduce error rates.  Drop-down menus should be designed 
with safeguards to decrease the likelihood of selection errors. Development of more 
sophisticated clinical decision support, which can perform checks on free-text, may also prevent 
errors. Further research is needed to ensure that systems minimize error likelihood and meet 
users’ workflow expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The Institute of Medicine reported that adverse events are responsible for as many as 
98,000 deaths in the United States (US) each year.(1) More recent evidence suggests that as 
many as 400,000 premature deaths occur each year in the US due to preventable harm.(2) Errors 
in the prescribing and administration of medicines, increasingly complex medical practice (e.g., 
an ageing population), and the increased use of technology, have all been quoted as possible 
reasons for this increase.(1-3) 
Adoption rates of Electronic Health Records have increased in the U.S. following the 
meaningful use program.(4) Computerized provider order entry (CPOE) systems with clinical 
decision support (CDS) functionality have been shown to reduce the occurrence of prescribing 
errors.(5-9) These systems can “facilitate and enhance the communication of a prescription, 
aiding the choice, administration or supply of a medicine through decision support and provide a 
robust audit trail for the entire medicines use process".(10) However, reports have also emerged 
that these CPOE systems (with or without CDS) have contributed to new types of errors in both 
primary and secondary care,(3, 11, 12) some of which are potentially serious in nature, like a 
prescription for a 70 times overdose of diamorphine that occurred due to miss-selection of a dose 
from a drop down menu.(13) These errors have been frequently referred to as the ‘unintended 
adverse consequences’ of technology,(11, 14) a term which describes both the unexpected and 
undesirable nature of these events.(15)  
Due to the relative newness of CPOE systems in many health care organizations, 
developers and users may be unaware of the generation or causes of these ‘new’ errors. A lack of 
consideration of human factor principles during the design stage has contributed to these issues 
emerging.(16, 17) Despite certification requirements from the Office of the National Coordinator 
for Health Information Technology requiring vendors to employ a user-centered design process, 
a recent study reported that just over half of vendors studied actually employed usability staff, 
and that use of this approach was variable at best.(18)  
A study by Koppel et al. in 2005 sought to identify and quantify the role of CPOE in 
facilitating prescribing errors. Since then, many more studies have used qualitative techniques to 
provide a rich understanding of the types and causes of these errors.(19) However, to the best of 
our knowledge, there has been no published systematic literature review specifically looking at 
CPOE related prescribing errors. To address this gap, we conducted a systematic review to 
understand the different types and causes of errors that occur during the prescribing process 
when using CPOE systems, and to make recommendations about how these systems could be 
improved.  
 
METHODS AND MATERIALS 
Our review was conducted according to PRISMA guidelines;(20) each step is summarized 
below. 
 
Eligibility criteria 
Primary research studies that focused on prescribing errors associated with CPOE systems were 
eligible for inclusion. We were interested in studies that included qualitative data about the types 
and causes of these errors. Our search strategy covered the use of any type of CPOE system (e.g., 
self-developed or commercial) in any clinical setting (e.g., hospitals, outpatients and primary 
care). Quantitative data were not included because this review was aimed at describing the types 
and causes of CPOE related errors and not the frequency of errors. Studies published in peer-
reviewed journals or conference proceedings between 1st January 2004 and 22nd June 2015 were 
eligible for inclusion. This allowed us to focus on articles published since Koppel et al.’s seminal 
paper, thus focusing on the current and pertinent issues that have since emerged. The search was 
restricted to English language publications. Editorials, commentaries, letters and opinion articles 
were excluded.  
 
Information sources and search  
Three large databases were searched: the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health 
Literature (CINAHL), Embase (via OVID) and Medline (via OVID). Appropriate search terms 
were developed and grouped into ‘sets’, specifically relating to ‘computerized provider order 
entry’, ‘clinical decision support’, ‘electronic health records’ and ‘errors’. In each set, terms were 
combined with the ‘OR’ operator and all sets were then combined with the ‘AND’ operator. 
These sets are available via the online supplementary material. Database functionality was used 
(where possible) to restrict the search to qualitative studies. This search was conducted on the 
22nd June 2015.  
 
Study selection  
After duplicate articles were removed, three independent reviewers (CB, HM and KT) screened 
the titles to determine if the articles met the inclusion criteria. Two authors (CB and HM, or CB 
and KT) then independently reviewed all abstracts and full texts, with one author (CB) acting as 
a constant across all publications. Disagreements were resolved by discussion, with arbitration 
by a fourth additional reviewer (SPS), if necessary. The reason why a publication was rejected 
was also documented.  
 
Data collection and analysis  
A customized data extraction sheet was used by each of the three independent reviewers (CB, 
HM and KT) to extract specific details about each study’s location, objectives, methods and key 
findings. A narrative synthesis of all eligible studies was undertaken. Papers were read and re-
read by three authors (CB, KT and HT), and key recurring themes and sub-themes were 
identified iteratively from the data.  
 
Bias Assessment 
We accept that due to the subjective nature of qualitative research bias may occur. A critical 
analysis of included studies was performed using the CASP tool for qualitative research.(21) 
Mays and Pope have advocated the use of methodological triangulation (use of two or more 
methods) as a way of strengthening the research design and safeguarding the ‘validity’ of 
qualitative studies.(22) We also assessed the included studies for the use of methodological 
triangulation.  
 
  
Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of the steps involved in the literature search 
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Number of titles screened 
(n = 1,185) 
Number of abstracts 
screened 
(n = 468) 
Duplicate articles and 
Records excluded: 
(n = 717) 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility 
(n = 149) 
Full-text articles excluded (n=115) for the 
following reasons:  
 
 Lack of detail about CPOE related prescribing 
error(s):  57 
 Not a primary research study: 36 
 Quantitative study : 14 
 Lack of detail about the causes of CPOE related 
prescribing error: 7 
 Other: 1 
 Studies included in 
qualitative synthesis 
(n = 34) 
Records excluded: 
(n=319) 
RESULTS 
 
A total of 1,185 publications were identified through the database search, with 1,036 excluded 
after removing duplicates and screening the titles and abstracts. On reviewing 149 full text 
articles, 115 were excluded; a total of 34 were therefore included in the final review. These were 
comprised of 31 full text articles and 3 conference abstracts. Studies were conducted in the U.S. 
(n=19), U.S and Canada (n=4), Canada (n=1), U.K. (n=4), Australia (n=2), Spain (n=1), Sweden 
(n=1), Netherlands (n=1) and Denmark (n=1). Our bias assessment revealed three articles that 
did not use more than one method of data collection.(23-25) All articles were included as they 
provided valuable insights. A table summarising the key findings of the articles has been 
provided (see Appendix 1). 
 
A descriptive and narrative synthesis of the data was undertaken to understand the different types 
and causes of prescribing errors associated with CPOE systems, and eight key themes were 
identified and are discussed in detail below.  
  
(1) Computer Screen Display: The layout of the computer screen display affected how users 
viewed patient information. Displaying an incomplete list of a patient’s medications on the 
computer screen was found by Horsky et al. to have contributed to an incident where a patient 
was prescribed an overdose of potassium chloride and subsequently developed severe 
hyperkalaemia.(26) Analysis of the same incident also revealed how intravenous (IV) 
medications were not displayed in the area of the screen where the patient’s other medications 
were. This was likely to result in users missing or not considering these medicines when 
prescribing.(26) Similar issues have been raised in other studies by Wetterneck et al. and Koppel 
et al, who suggested that a failure to display all orders, including active, recently administered, 
PRN (when required) and STAT (immediate), may inhibit the user from reviewing the entirety of 
a patient’s medications and result in duplicate doses being prescribed.(3, 27) The use of multiple 
screens, which require users to click through various parts of the CPOE system in order to access 
the necessary information, have been found to disrupt workflow and also lead to users 
incorrectly entering information ‘where it might fit’ rather than where it was intended to go. The 
danger is that such information might not then be visible to other users and clinical safety checks 
may be bypassed.(11) Horsky et al. also found that similarly designed screens in one system had 
important functional differences e.g., the parameter for limiting the amount of medication 
delivered was time dependent for drip (IV infusion) administration yet dose dependent for IV 
bolus administration, and subsequently could be easily confused by prescribers.(26) The ease of 
moving between different patients on an electronic system was also felt by Adelman et al. to 
have contributed to the placement of wrong patient orders, particularly if the prescriber’s 
workflow had been interrupted.(28)   
  
(2) Drop-down menus and Auto-population: It is no surprise that selection errors associated 
with different drop down lists (e.g., patient names, medication names, drug dosages, etc.) have 
been frequently reported.(3, 28-31) Westbrook et al. examined the system related errors that 
occurred across two commercial CPOE systems and found numerous examples of selection 
errors. These included specific cases where the wrong route of a medication, e.g., sodium 
chloride 0.9% infusion via the epidural route instead of the IV route, were selected.(32) 
Juxtaposition errors, whereby a medication listed before or after the desired medication was 
erroneously chosen, also resulted in orders being placed for drugs with an entirely different 
indication than what was intended.(11) One example included users’ miss-selection of 
ethamsylate (a hemostatic agent) instead of ethambutol (an antibiotic) from a drug list.(29) 
Delays in system response time resulted in prescribers using ‘multiple clicks’ to select a drug 
item, which increased the risk of miss-selection.(30) Odukoya et al. highlighted that inadvertent 
‘mouse wheeling’ (selecting an incorrect item by unknowingly scrolling past it) could also have 
contributed to incorrect orders being placed.(33) A range of prescribing errors have been 
attributed to the presence of auto-population functionality, whereby on entering the first few 
letters (or numbers) of a drug name (or dose), the system ‘suggests’ information that could be 
easily selected in error.(33, 34) Snyder et al. encountered a wrong drug order when “vir” was 
typed for the intended drug “Viread”, and  “efa “vir” enz”, an alternative antiretroviral was 
suggested, as a prescribing option by the system autofill functionality and erroneously 
selected.(35)  
 
(3) Wording: The wording of the text used within CPOE systems has also been shown to 
contribute to prescribing errors. For example, in one study users misinterpreted the data label  
‘total volume’, which they thought meant the total volume of dose that should be administered, 
rather than the system ‘meaning’ (i.e., the total volume of an individual bag of fluid). Horsky et 
al. described these misinterpretations as a ‘user-design mismatch’.(26) Another example 
included a dose of 20 mg written as 0020.000 MG, which could be misinterpreted due to the 
additional zeros presented. (36) One study that explored CPOE related prescribing errors in a 
general practice setting found that users had difficulty finding items or knowing the specific 
wording that would allow them to select certain drugs, e.g., a particular type of insulin from a 
pick-list.(30)  
 
(4) Default Settings: Overly restrictive default settings have been associated with a number of 
CPOE related prescribing errors. Prescribers may simply fail to change a default order sentence 
containing drug name, form and dosage, or a default time presented by the system, thus resulting 
in a patient receiving the wrong dose, missing a dose or receiving it at an unintended time.(3, 29, 
32)  Koppel et al. found that some ‘late in the day orders’, where the prescriber had intended the 
patient to receive the drug on the same day, were delayed until the next day, with potential 
consequences for the patient.(3) If the drug combination carbidopa/levodopa (Sinemet ®), for 
example, is not administered at the appropriate time, then a patient with Parkinson’s disease can 
experience increased motor-symptoms. Similarly, duplicate dose errors have been reported, with 
a patient being administered a night-time dose of the antiviral efavirenz (Sustiva) and an 
inappropriate second dose the following morning because the system automatically defaulted to a 
09:00am daily dose.(35) Lack of knowledge about the default stop dates and times of certain 
medications can also lead to errors.(26) Some systems combine default order sentences as part of 
an order set to make it easier to prescribe a group of medicines, e.g. for post-surgical analgesia. 
Doctors interviewed in one study described an instance where a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory 
drug was ‘hidden’ in an order set and inappropriately prescribed to an asthmatic patient.(29)  
Default settings for some particular medicines used in certain clinical specialities therfore, may 
not be appropriate due to the range of prescribing options which are dependent on patient 
specific factors. For example, the dose of azathioprine (an immunosuppressant) is often 
dependent on the patient’s weight, indication, laboratory results and thiopurine S-
methyltransferase (TPMT) activity, thus a list of suggested doses may be confusing unless the 
system is able to guide the user by taking these other patient factors into consideration. 
 
(5) Non-intuitive ordering or information transmission: Inflexible or complex ordering 
processes made entering some orders particularly difficult and resulted in users employing 
workarounds. These included, selecting a default drug order sentence (e.g., give twice daily) and 
adding a contradictory free-text comment that advises the nurse to administer something 
different (e.g., give three times daily). Unfamiliar abbreviations were also entered in free-text 
boxes, which in turn were open to misinterpretation by different users.(36) Zhan et al. found that 
a CPOE system failed to recognize the abbreviation ‘TID’ (take three times a day) and therefore 
did not record this order.(37) Odukoya et al. described an example of confusing directions 
written in free-text: “take a half tablet and there will be a period and then it will say take two 
tablets…”.(38) Users employed workarounds to prescribe complex prescriptions, which are 
generally very difficult to write electronically, such as tapering courses of prednisolone.(39) 
‘Copy and paste’ functionality, which is designed to save users time, was also found to 
unintentionally give rise to the generation of incorrect orders.(23) Wentzer et al. also observed 
instances where medications, which had been previously prescribed on a prior hospital admission 
and stopped, were transferred to the new admission as an ‘active’ medication and inappropriately 
continued.(40) 
 
 (5.1) Interoperability Issues: One study described the compatibility issues between a 
prescribing system and a community pharmacy system, which related to a failure of one system 
to correctly interpret the terminology, possibly due to a lack of standardised codes, in requests, 
e.g., ‘magnesium citrate’ or ‘mag. citrate’. Certain requests (e.g., mag. citrate) were translated 
incorrectly by the community pharmacy system once received, and led to prescriptions being 
generated for the inappropriate drug name, quantity package size, and patient name.(33)  
Similarly, Nanji et al. identified important information that was omitted from prescriptions 
electronically ordered from either inpatient or outpatient prescribing systems and received by a 
community pharmacy system. It was felt that this was related to a mismatch between the text-box 
size in the prescribing system (on which the order was originally placed) and the pharmacy 
system (on which the order was received), thus leading to certain information being missed or 
not communicated.(41) 
 
 (6) Repeat prescriptions and automated processes: An important difference between 
handwritten and electronic prescriptions is the ease with which a repeat electronic prescription 
can be generated with a few simple clicks.(31) This is clearly more efficient for users, but there 
is a downside. There have been cases where pharmacists have picked up prescription errors in 
the past but the original prescriptions (which contained the error) were not updated in the system 
and subsequently repeated.(33, 41) These erroneous electronic prescriptions may be harder to 
detect as one study participant describes: “But if there's a black and white typed document that 
includes nonsense, it is harder to recognize it and it's more easily overlooked or assumed to be 
correct…”.(31)   
 
(7) Users work processes: Inappropriate work processes, for example entering all of a patient’s 
medicines in batches at the end of a ward round on the CPOE system, pose safety risks.(42) 
Issues can arise around whether a prescriber can correctly recall potentially large lists of 
medications.(40) Delays in entering information can result in clinicians, who were not present on 
the ward round, being unable to immediately utilise such information for their own decision 
making.(42) Similarly, an inconvenient log-in process can give rise to users working under other 
colleagues’ log-ins, which has both legal and professional implications.(43) Wentzer et al. found 
that some doctors would login to the CPOE system and allow a nurse to work under their 
account, thus the person whose ID the system recognised as making an order was not actually the 
true prescriber of that order.(40) 
 
(8) CDS systems: The consequences of over-alerting and alert fatigue are well described in the 
literature.(34, 44) However, a lack of appropriate safeguards may also prevent prescribing errors 
from being detected, particularly if users have wrongly assumed that their orders are being 
checked. For example, Schiff et al. identified one hospital site that was unaware that their CDS 
alerts had been switched off following a system update.(39) This study also identified many CDS 
systems that did not offer sufficient protection againist many common errors.(39) Wetterneck et 
al. found that orders for different forms of the same medication e.g., metoprolol 25mg tablets 
(oral) and metoprolol 5mg IV, were not identified as potential duplicates when prescribed 
together, and therefore did not generate an alert.(27) Underutilisation of CDS functionality was 
reported by Khajouei et al. who found that a button prescribers needed to click to perform a 
dosage calculation was not clearly displayed, and therefore prescribers continued to manually 
calculate doses, which increased the risk of potental human errors.(43) CDS systems have also 
provided users with erroneous information, such as inappropriate dosages that do not take into 
account patient specific factors (e.g., reduced renal function) (34) or orders based on outdated 
drug information.(39)  
DISCUSSION 
 
In this evaluation, we have described the types and causes of prescribing errors associated with 
CPOE systems, specifically identifying themes from qualitative studies. The eight key areas 
were: computer screen display; drop-down menus and autopopulation; wording; default settings; 
non-intuitive ordering or information transmission; repeat prescriptions and automated 
processes; users work processes; and CDS alerting. All of these relate closely to human factors 
and user-centered design. Table 1 provides a summary of the key themes, associated issues and 
recommendations, and whether the error could be classified (predominantly) as system related, 
user related or both. 
Table 1: Key themes, associated issues and recommendations. 
Main Error 
Facilitator 
Key Themes  Specific Issues Recommendations 
System related Computer 
Screen 
Display 
 Incomplete 
Display.(3,26,27) 
 Navigation between 
multiple Screens.(11, 28) 
 Confusing data labels.(26) 
 All medications 
(oral, intravenous 
etc.) and all statuses 
(active and 
discontinued etc.) 
should be clearly 
displayed in one 
area if possible. 
 The naming of data 
labels should be 
unambiguous. 
 Post-
implementation 
testing is crucial to 
identify any issues.  
 Consistent use of 
color and design 
throughout the 
system. 
System related Drop-down 
Menus and 
 Miss-selection errors:(3, 11, 28-
33) 
 Avoid overly long 
lists of patient’s 
Auto-
population 
o Similar named medications or 
patients located next to each 
other 
o Orders listed above or below 
the intended order 
o Delays in the system response 
time and the consequent use 
of ‘multiple clicks’ 
o Scrolling onto the wrong 
order 
 Erroneous suggestions of 
medications, doses or 
patients.(33-35) 
names or 
medications. 
 Distinction 
between ‘look-
alike-sound-alike’ 
medications using 
tall man lettering, 
color or bold font. 
 Indication based 
CDS alerts. 
 Improved 
sensitivity and 
specificity of CDS 
functions. 
System related  Wording  Confusion between the 
system’s wording and 
user’s interpretation of 
that meaning.(26, 30) 
 Unnecessary ‘trailing 
zeros’ i.e., 0020.000mg 
instead of 20mg.(36) 
 Pre and post-
evaluation of 
user’s normal 
workflow and 
practice to ensure 
user-informed 
design. 
 Enable local 
customisation 
according to local 
practice and 
terminology.  
System related 
& User related   
Default 
Settings 
User related 
 Failure to change 
suggested default 
settings.(3, 29, 32, 35) 
 Lack of knowledge about 
default settings. (26) 
System related 
 Orders hidden within pre-
defined order sentences 
and order sets.(29) 
 User education 
and training about 
complex 
prescribing 
functions and 
challenges that 
may be 
encountered with 
using the system. 
 Development of 
more 
sophisticated, 
patient specific 
pre-defined order 
sentences and 
order sets. 
System related  Non-intuitive  Lack of standardized  Facilitate local 
ordering or 
information 
transmission 
terminology.(33, 36-38) 
 Interoperability 
issues.(33, 41) 
customization to 
incorporate local 
terminology. 
 Consistent use of 
key terms 
between systems. 
 Addressing 
interoperability 
issues between 
standalone 
systems, 
particularly at the 
transmission of 
information stage. 
System related Repeat 
Prescriptions 
and 
Automated 
Processes 
 Repetition of previously 
corrected errors.(31, 33, 
41) 
 Reduced visibility of 
computerized errors.(31) 
 Introduce 
additional checks 
into the 
prescribing 
process. 
 User training and 
education about 
the risks of using 
workarounds. 
User related User’s Work 
Processes 
 Batch order entry (40, 42) 
 Users working under 
another colleague’s log-
in. (40, 43) 
 User education 
and training about 
the risks of using 
workarounds. 
System related 
and user 
related 
CDS Systems User related 
 Lack of knowledge about 
the CDS checks that are 
being performed.(39) 
System related 
 Inconsistent and 
insufficient use of CDS to 
safeguard against 
errors.(27, 39) 
 Poor CDS design.(43) 
 Erroneous suggestions 
due to issues with, CDS 
sensitivity, specificity and 
accuracy of 
information.(34, 39) 
 Education and 
training about the 
systems functions 
(and lack of) 
 Use of CDS, where 
a clinical need has 
been identified. 
 Refining the 
sensitivity and 
specificity of CDS 
Abbreviations:  
CDS Clinical Decision Support 
 
This systematic review described errors relating to the way information was displayed on the 
computer screens.(26, 42) One simple solution might be to organise the screen layout such that 
all medications (including both oral and IV) are listed in one area, with minimal navigation 
required. Additionally, data labels should be clear to the user and guide them to separate areas 
where further specific information can be obtained.(17, 45) System developers and implementers 
should consider the potential for a ‘user-design mismatch’ and the importance of designing the 
system according to the users’ workflow and the terminology that they use.(26) Indeed, as many 
issues may not be identified until after system implementation, there is a clear need for post-
implementation testing to ensure that these systems are working as intended.(42) Chan et al., 
found that a well-designed CPOE system could also possibly reduce the need for training, with 
no participants requesting assistance when ordering using the user-centred design format 
compared to over one third of participants requesting assistance on a ‘standard’ CPOE test 
system.(46). Horsky et al. demonstrated the potential for confusion amongst users who used 
functions that were visually very similar on the order screen, but behaved differently e.g., the 
function to calculate total dose for drip (infusion) or IV (bolus) orders.(26) Design tools, such as 
colour and language, should be applied consistently throughout a system (and possibly all 
systems) to prevent users misinterpreting information during the prescribing process.(17)  
 
The design of CPOE systems is a critical consideration. Drop-down menus can provide a list of 
drug dosing options in ascending or descending order, so as to make it easier for prescribers to 
find exactly what they are looking for. However, long lists of medications, particularly those 
listed alphabetically, with names which look-alike or sound-alike are prone to selection errors. 
Westbrook et al. found that 43% of system-related errors were due to selection errors, which led 
the authors to conclude that reducing the opportunities for users to ‘select’ items from lists 
during the course of prescribing may reduce CPOE related errors.(32) This should be weighed 
against the potential consequences of prescribers entering erroneous doses in free-text, and the 
additional time this manual entry of information may take.(17) Tall man lettering has been used 
to help users distinguish between similar drug names such as hydrOXYzine and 
hydrALAzine.(47) There is some limited evidence from experimental studies to support its use 
more generally;(48) however, there is currently a lack of robust studies relating specifically to 
CPOE systems.(47) Galanter et al. showed that indication-based alerts can help intercept wrong 
drug and wrong patient orders (commonly encountered with selection and autofill entry errors), 
by halting the prescriber’s workflow and allowing them to self-correct the order.(49) Due to the 
potential burden of excessive CDS alerting, the limited use of indication alerts for high risk, 
look-alike-sound-alike, drug pairs should be considered.(50)  
 
The issues identified in this review pertaining to default doses have been supported in the 
quantitative literature. Eslami et al. found that 86% (n=113) of orders placed for two 
aminoglycoside antibiotics (gentamycin and tobramycin) using the suggested default dose were 
associated with an overdose, compared to only 53% (n=66) cases when the default dose was not 
selected. This default dose was based on an average sized adult with normal renal function, and 
thus poses the question about whether such default doses are well placed in certain clinical 
specialities where patients are more likely to have parameters that frequently fluctuate outside of 
normal limits (e.g. ICU or a nephrology ward).(51) Order sets can standardize prescribing and 
improve adherence to guidelines. However, we found that certain items were inadvertently 
prescribed for some patients (via an order set) as they were ‘hidden’ among a list of medications, 
which included both suitable and unsuitable items. Bobb et al. suggested that order sets should 
be more patient specific, presenting only relevant recommendations e.g., a non-penicillin drug 
for a penicillin allergic patient as first-line treatment.(52) They also recommended that individual 
items within an order are linked, so that they updated in unison. For instance, if an order set 
contains supportive therapy (e.g., a proton pump inhibitor) for an indicated medication (e.g., 
steroid), the supportive therapy should be ceased when the indicated medicine is 
discontinued.(52) 
 
We found that free-text orders are commonly used as a method of bypassing system 
requirements or CDS alerts. A quantitative study conducted by Palchuk et al. found 
discrepancies between the information contained in the structured and free-text fields in 16% 
(n=470) of electronic prescriptions.(53) System developers should consider the development of 
more sophisticated CDS which can perform checks on free-text orders.(53) Furthermore, the 
frequent use of free-text options by users may suggest a lack of suitable structured functions. 
Dhavle et al. found that many free-text comments encountered in their study, could be avoided 
by using an updated version of the electronic prescribing system, which incorporated additional 
structured fields.(54) Developers should address this need by providing prescribing options, such 
as a tapering course of steroids or alternate day dosing, as part of ongoing system optimisation 
and development;(55) in addition to accelerating the rate at which new functionality reaches 
users.(54) Certain CPOE systems are unable to accommodate prescriptions for drugs given via 
multiple routes (oral and rectal); this suggests a possible lack of understanding and consideration 
of actual prescribing and administration practices that would need to be addressed. Ongoing 
testing and evaluation of systems (and any customisations made) is needed in order to optimise 
and enhance CPOE systems following initial implementation.(56) 
 
CDS has undoubtedly contributed to a reduction in errors and has huge potential to further 
improve safety in the future.(57) However, as this review has found, there is still much to be 
done to improve the safety of these systems. Schiff et al. discovered that only 26.6% (n=95) of a 
sample of erroneous test-orders generated warnings thus allowing many potentially harmful 
orders to be placed.(39) Additionally, there was considerable variability in the way organisations 
implemented CDS functionality and the ability of different systems to warn clinicians about 
errors,(39) which may confuse users who work across multiple sites. Wright et al. also found 
examples of malfunctioning CDS, resulting in a failure to generate warnings when needed or the 
production of unnecessary alerts. Such malfunctions were due to software upgrades, code 
changes, accidental alteration of CDS rules, and faults with external systems.(58) Customisation 
is crucial for organisations striving to achieve safer patient care following CPOE 
implementation. One study found that even a small 5% increase in the Leapfrog score (an 
evaluation tool, which tests CPOE systems ability to safeguard against erroneous test order) was 
associated with a significant reduction in preventable adverse drug events.(59) Thus, 
organisations should be reassured of the benefits of customising their system to include a range 
of CDS checks. Perhaps one of the most crucial developments will be the production of more 
patient specific and better worded alerts to reduce the impact of alert fatigue and erroneous 
suggestions.(60) A recently published study by Slight et al. found that some alerts (e.g., duplicate 
drug alerts) contained confusing wording and did not explicitly describe the error present, (e.g., 
“(the drug) already exists . . . under the selected assessment”, highlighting the need to improve 
system usability.(50)  
 
Human factors and user-centered design is key across all of these eight areas and should be 
prioritized when developing these systems. There is a need to thoroughly evaluate CPOE related 
incidents so as to better understand system failings, using various (or a combination of different) 
approaches(61) such as failure mode and effect analysis,(62) visual and cognitive walkthrough 
evaluation,(26) and usability evaluation techniques (including semi-structured interviews and 
observations).(63) Phansalkar et al. created a list of such principles specific to the design of CDS 
alerts to prevent confusion and maximize their impact.(64) Russ et al. saw a significant reduction 
in prescribing errors when they redesigned CDS alerts according to human factors principles;(65) 
this was attributed to improved visibility of text, more logical organisation of information and 
more informative alerts.  
 
This systematic review has provided strong insights into the key structural design elements 
associated with CPOE related prescribing errors. However, we have only reported what has been 
published in the literature and there may be unpublished work that could also provide valuable 
insights. Another possible limitation is that our review spans over ten years and it is possible that 
some system vendors may be currently working on or have already addressed some of the issues 
highlighted.(3) For instance, all six EHRs evaluated in one study displayed patient identifiers on 
the top of the computer screen throughout the prescribing process, thus helping to reduce wrong 
patient errors.(36) We also acknowledge that we did not register our review with a prospective 
register for systematic reviews. Finally, there may also have been a publication bias towards 
studies that reported more positive findings and consequently the number of different types of 
CPOE related prescribing errors may be much higher. However, the findings of this review 
highlight the need for further research into uncovering these specific types of errors and for the 
establishment of a national reporting database where these types of errors should be logged and 
addressed (both by vendors and by local customisation teams.(19, 66)  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We identified eight key areas that have been associated with CPOE related prescribing errors—
all relate closely to human factors and user-centered design. The design and layout of the 
computer screen display should be carefully considered. Drop-down menus should be designed 
with safeguards to prevent the occurrence of selection errors. Local customisation and 
development of more sophisticated CDS, which is able to perform checks on free-text and 
provide users with adequate prescribing functions, is clearly needed. Developers must aim to 
improve the specificity, sensitivity and usability of these systems in light of the recent research in 
this area.  
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